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This article provides an overview of the internal conflicts within 
Nigeria, doing so primarily through explaining the role of Nigeria’s 
youth in either igniting or sustaining the types of insurgency that 
have plagued the country in the post-military era. In pursuing this, 
the paper focuses on the activities of the Niger Delta militants, 
which dominated the start of the current democratic dispensation, 
and those of the Boko Haram insurgents in the north. The paper 
suggests socio-economic empowerment of the youths as an antidote 
to youth unemployment, and, by extension, as a way to avert future 
armed insurrection and other forms of violent conflicts that have 
become synonymous with Nigerian youths.  
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Introduction 
The challenges currently confronting the Nigerian state transcend 
the previously simple case of boundary disputes and communal 
clashes to become something much more complex like armed 
insurrection. Insecurity posed by different forms of insurgency is now 
the most conspicuous feature of the country. Besides wreaking all 
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sorts of havoc on the country and its population, insurgency has 
attached to the Nigerian state the labels ‘dysfunctional state’, ‘weak 
state’ and ‘failed state’. The murderous activities of Boko Haram, an 
Islamist terrorist group, have particularly constituted a serious threat 
to the security of the country, as well as its existence as a legitimate 
entity. There is no denying that the spate of insurgency that 
permeates post-military Nigeria is traceable partly to the air of 
freedom enjoyed by the citizens. However, as shall be demonstrated 
in relation to the reign of terror orchestrated by the dreaded Boko 
Haram in the north and the series of militant activities in Nigeria’s 
oil-rich region, the excruciating pangs of poverty, deeply rooted in the 
unemployment profile of the country, are a major explanatory factor 
of why many young men partake in armed conflict against their 
country.  
Nigeria’s return to democratic governance in 1999 after fifteen 
years of military dictatorship provides the aggrieved in the country 
with an avenue to voice their grievances in a manner that was 
considered unimaginable during the military era. For instance, the 
people of the Niger Delta who had considered certain government 
policies inimical to their local interest seized the opportunity 
presented by democratic governance to intensify their quest for an 
equitable distribution of Nigeria’s wealth. This campaign, however, 
took the form of armed struggle, with the youths taking a leading role. 
The ongoing campaign of terror in the northern part of Nigeria is a 
different type of expression of resentment, which also has never 
before been experienced in the history of the country. The question, 
therefore, is: what drives these young men to join armed groups? This 
is the fundamental question we aim to address in this paper.  
This paper posits that the emergence of armed groups in the 
country’s nascent democracy is firmly rooted in a myriad of socio-
economic factors. However, for reasons of expediency, we have 
decided to focus on youth unemployment. Our central argument is 
that the swelling ranks of unemployed youths have fed the growth 
of insurrection in Nigeria. Unemployed youths are driven to violence 
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by those conditions that give rise to frustration and hopelessness. This 
assertion gains currency amongst Nigerians, who believe that Boko 
Haram leadership takes advantage of the unemployment situation in 
the country to recruit young men, in particular into their ranks. 
Having been radicalised by controversial Islamic clerics who cajole 
them into believing that their efforts will result in an Islamic state 
devoid of corruption, as well as earn them a place in paradise, jobless 
youths, especially those in the north, become willing tools in the 
hands of terrorists.  
This article will, above all, provide an overview of the recent 
history of Nigeria and of the principal contributors to its internal 
conflicts. This overview will become apparent as we discuss certain 
elements in particular – the widespread youth unemployment and 
poverty that give rise to frustration and aggression.   
Theoretical Explanations of Insurrection  
Scholars of conflict studies have, to varying degrees, postulated 
that conflict is a dependent variable in the sense that it is usually 
caused by other variables. Some have particularly linked societal 
conflicts to failure of the state (Rotberg, 2003; Zartman, 1995), while 
others maintain that aggression, caused by frustration, is at the heart 
of most conflicts (Dollard et al., 1939; Gurr, 1970, 1993). The state-
failure thesis contends that the absence of a responsive state capable 
of delivering needed services sometimes propels nonstate actors, such 
as religious and community leaders, to intervene in ameliorating the 
plight of the poor and aggrieved members of society, who in turn 
reward the leaders with utmost loyalty (Maiangwa et al., 2012: 43). 
The frustration–aggression theory, on the other hand, holds that “the 
existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” 
(Dollard et al., 1939: 1).  
The frustration–aggression theory simply attempts to explain why 
some people, or groups of people, become aggressive and violent in 
certain situations. The theory suggests that social movements and 
protest groups, for instance, emerge when individuals or groups of 
individuals become frustrated due to, in most cases, certain societal 
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ills such as unemployment and poverty. In other words, frustration 
tends to turn into aggression, which may then result in the frustrated 
person engaging in acts of violence. Not being in gainful employment, 
for example, especially in a country like Nigeria where the welfare 
system is non-existent, could be very frustrating and may result in 
aggressive behaviour. However, a fear of punishment means that 
aggression does not always develop into violence (Dollard et al., 1939: 
32–4).  
Scholars predisposed to the frustration–aggression thesis as an 
explanatory factor in the ignition and sustenance of conflict are of the 
view that a group’s shared grievances about marginalisation, for 
instance, tend to give rise to violent responses against the source of 
their marginalisation (Gurr, 1970, 1993). These scholars see 
frustration as the tension that results when someone or a group of 
people perceive that they are being prevented from achieving their 
goal. This theory is significant in explaining the petro-violence that 
pervaded the Niger Delta region, and the Boko Haram reign of terror 
in which the aggrieved youths chose to target the Nigerian state, 
believing that the state is responsible for their woes. As shall be 
demonstrated later, frustration, precipitated by such socio-economic 
problems as unemployment and poverty, has caused certain 
individuals and groups to be aggressive towards the Nigerian state. 
Therefore, in this article, our discussion of armed insurrection, 
especially in regards to post-military Nigeria, will be situated within 
the context of the frustration–aggression theory, but this is not 
suggesting that the state-failure thesis will not be given the attention it 
deserves.  
Youth Unemployment in Nigeria 
In general, unemployment has become a major macro-economic 
challenge facing both the developed and the underdeveloped 
economies, especially since the global economic crisis of 2007, which 
deepened the level of poverty across the world. The African Economic 
Outlook estimates that 53 million of Africa’s 200 million young men 
between ages 15 and 24 are in unstable employment and 40 million 
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are out of work, while 18 million of these are looking for a job and 22 
million have already given up (AfDB et al., 2012). Despite the 
country’s impressive economic growth between 2010 and 2012, 
unemployment remains very high and more than 60 per cent of the 
population lives below the poverty line (AfDB et al., 2012: 2).  
Table 1:      Nigeria’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 1998–2014 
Source: Babalola, 2015: 63 
The causes of youth unemployment are multifaceted, but in 
Nigeria, the impact of elite corruption cannot be overemphasised. 
Corruption is not limited to any particular country, but is widespread 
in oil-rich Nigeria, which is one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world. Table 1 above shows Nigeria’s corruption rating in the post-
                                 
3 This scale ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).  
Year Number of 
Countries Surveyed 
Country Rank CPI Score (Out of 
10)3 
1998   85                       81 1.9 
1999   99                        98 1.6 
2000   90                        90 1.2 
2001   91                        90 1.0 
2002 102                    101 1.6 
2003 133                    132 1.4 
2004 145 144 1.6 
2005 158 152 1.9 
2006 163 142 2.2 
2007 179 147 2.2 
2008 180 121 2.7 
2009 180 130 2.5 
2010 178 134 2.4 
2011 183 143 2.4 
2012 176 139 2.7 
2013 177 144 2.5 
2014 175 136 2.7 
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military era as provided by Transparency International.   
The lack of public scrutiny that characterised public spending 
during the military era was reverted to at all levels of government in 
the post-1999 period, with political elites sharing the spoils of office 
with impunity (Mustapha, 2009: 76). In Nigeria, access to the state is 
synonymous with access to state resources, which is in turn 
synonymous with the economic advancement of the individual. With 
the absence of checks on office holders, public funds that could have 
been invested in infrastructure with potential for creating jobs are 
systematically siphoned by the elites through misappropriation.  
A low level of education, which has in turn created a considerable 
skills gap among youth at working age, has also contributed to the rise 
in youth unemployment in Nigeria. Poverty and lack of financial 
support from governments have limited most young men and 
women’s accessibility to higher education, which would have provided 
them with the necessary educational qualifications and knowledge 
required in the modern job market. For example, it is not uncommon 
for multinational oil companies to resist the acquisition of oil 
expertise by nationals principally because of their belief that only the 
oil giants possess the technical know-how of oil exploration, while the 
local people lack the required skills (Turner, 1980). At the other 
extreme, the increasing number of university and polytechnic 
graduates leads to an increase in the supply of educated manpower 
relative to demand. Nigeria has about a hundred universities and a 
similar number of polytechnics, all of which produce tens of 
thousands of graduates each year. Also, more often than not, there is 
a mismatch between the graduates’ skills and what is required for 
available employment opportunities.  
In Nigeria, as in the rest of Africa, rural–urban migration also causes 
youth unemployment, as it is common for youths in search of greener 
pastures to migrate to urban areas. As Rosenthal (2012) observed, around 
50 per cent of Nigerians are urban dwellers, and the country’s 
unemployment rate is nearly 50 per cent for people in urban areas aged 15 
to 24. There is usually the assumption that it is not difficult to find 
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lucrative jobs in the cities because of the high concentration of industries. 
The availability of social amenities also makes the cities more attractive. 
These factors combined result in the population saturation that usually 
characterises urban centres, which consequently creates a scenario in 
which too many young people are busy chasing too few jobs.  
Also, Nigeria’s appalling security situation, especially during the 
post-military era, has combined with factors such as poor energy supply to 
render the investment climate non-conducive. Nigerian and foreign 
investors alike have either refused to invest in the country or have moved 
their investments to neighbouring countries where security and energy 
supply are relatively guaranteed, thus resulting in capital flight. It is 
logical to expect low investment to result in low demand for labour.   
Having provided an overview of the key factors responsible for youth 
unemployment in Nigeria, it then becomes imperative to highlight some 
of its consequences before proceeding to critically examine how the 
menace has contributed to the emergence of armed groups in the country. 
Economically, unemployment represents a significant waste of national 
economic resources. It also tends to reduce a country’s aggregate demand, 
giving rise to low consumption, and, with it, low income tax receipts. For 
the unemployed, one obvious consequence is low income, which 
eventually translates to a low standard of living that may, in extreme 
cases, lead to poverty. Unemployment contributes to poverty and poverty 
may also create unemployment, as people may be too poor to equip 
themselves or their children for the job market. 
In contextualising the grievous quandary of unemployment in 
Nigeria, we make reference to the recruitment exercise conducted by the 
Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) in 2014. The NIS advertised about 
four thousand positions, but over half a million young graduates showed 
interest. On the day of the aptitude test, which took place in a very small 
field, over twenty people were smothered or trampled to death, including 
four pregnant women, whilst several hundred were injured 
(http://www.punchng.com/news/18-die-in-immigration-recruitment-
exercise/; http://leadership.ng/news/355764/immigration-recruitment-
tragedy-23-feared-dead). The case was worsened by the fact that the sum 
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of one thousand naira was collected from each applicant, most of whom 
had been jobless for a considerable period of time. This situation is 
increasingly becoming the norm each time government establishments 
advertise vacancies. 
Niger Delta Youths and the Violent Struggle 
for Equitable Revenue Allocation  
In Nigeria, a classic case of youth activism in the pursuit of a political 
cause and the effects on the generation of violence may be found in the 
Niger Delta youth movements, whose activities since the country’s return 
to democratic rule have caused every government untold stress. Nigeria’s 
oil-centred economy transformed the Niger Delta region into the goose 
that lays the golden egg for the country, as the bulk of the country’s oil is 
derived from the region, making it the most central to Nigeria’s economic 
prosperity. Paradoxically, the national oil economy profoundly impacts 
the domestic economy of the region, as environmental degradation affects 
the economic life of the people. Niger Delta inhabitants are predominantly 
engaged in farming and fishing for their livelihood, but the oil economy 
has dislocated their socio-economic life, with farmers losing farmlands to 
either installation of oil infrastructure or to oil spills and in most cases 
with no adequate compensation. The negative effects of oil spillage, water 
pollution and gas flaring on the environment, as well as on the local 
inhabitants, have been well documented and therefore need no rehashing 
here (see Ejobowah, 2000; Frynas, 2001; Obi and Rustad, 2011). Decades 
of oil exploration in the Niger Delta region have resulted in colossal 
environmental degradation, and this is one of the premises upon which the 
struggle for an equitable revenue distribution system was based.  
The emergence of an oil-centric economy, particularly since the oil 
boom of 1973, which opened the country’s larger economy to a massive 
inflow of petro-dollars, resulted in mass youth unemployment in the oil-
rich region. Most youths became unemployed following the destruction of 
their farmlands and the pollution of available rivers. Unfortunately, these 
young men found it difficult to get jobs in the oil industry due to its 
capital-intensive nature. The oil economy not only weakens the mainstay 
of the traditional economic activities of this region, which previously 
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thrived on agriculture, but also created a huge population of unemployed 
youths. This scenario is aptly captured by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), which described the region as 
“suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure 
and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth 
and squalor, and endemic conflict” (UNDP, 2006: 9). It may therefore be 
argued that the violent clamour for a fairer revenue allocation system was 
borne out of the widespread feeling of deprivation. 
It is worth noting that after 1999, oil-producing states in the Niger 
Delta had their share of national oil-generated revenue increased by 
13 per cent (FGN, 1999: 66). This was a constitutional requirement, 
but the move was also aimed to redress the deep-seated deprivation 
that has characterised the region. However, the supposed benefits of 
extra revenue are constantly eroded by corruption (Babalola, 2014). 
Prior to this period, the country’s revenue-sharing practice revolved 
largely around the principle of derivation in which the source states 
obtained 50 per cent of the revenue derived from their areas, but this 
was de-emphasised during the military era. This change of fortune 
notwithstanding, Niger Delta elites continuously insist that the 
systematic downgrading of the derivation principle was a form of 
internal oppression of the ethnic minorities who populated the region. 
For them, reverting to the fiscal arrangement that pays considerable 
attention to derivation was the only viable solution to the conflict in 
the area.  
Nigeria is an oil-rich country, but its economic story has been 
characterised by a lack of appreciable growth and increasing poverty, 
a phenomenon Terry Lynn Karl (1997, 1999) describe as oil’s 
“paradox of plenty”. The massive inflow of oil rents into the country’s 
economy, especially since the boom period, has not provided the 
necessary impetus for economic development, as oil revenues are not 
ploughed back into productive economic activities. Mustapha (2009: 
77) poignantly pointed out that the rise in the international price of 
crude oil from around $12 a barrel in May 1999, when Nigeria 
returned to civilian rule, to $67 in January 2008, and hovering around 
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$100 for years thereafter, has resulted in a massive windfall for all 
levels of government, yet the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-
nots’ in the country continues to widen.  
The scenario of ‘want in the midst of plenty’ was evidently the 
driving force behind the petro-violence that became the conspicuous 
feature of the Niger Delta region in the post-1999 period. As 
highlighted by Babalola (2014: 120), successive governments at the 
centre have, since the country’s independence in 1960, put in place 
certain palliative measures aimed at solving the problem of the 
underdevelopment that has become a feature of the oil-producing 
region. Some of these measures include the establishment of such 
agencies as the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960, the 
Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) in 1976, the Oil 
Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) 
in 1992 and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 
2000. However, this top-down developmentalist approach, as 
remarked by Mustapha (2009), has not adequately addressed the 
socio-economic issues raised by the different interest groups in the 
area. Agencies established to solve problems have themselves become 
part of the problem, as they are turned into conduits through which a 
few individuals within the region enrich themselves (see, for example, 
Babalola, 2014, Omotola, 2007). The failure of these agencies 
explains why in 2008, the late Umar Yar’Adua-led Federal 
Government established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
ostensibly to support the developmental efforts of the central 
government and those of the myriad of multinational oil companies 
(MOCs) operating in the region.  
Oil giants like Shell, MOBIL and Chevron make huge profits from 
their exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta, but their contributions towards 
the social and economic development of the area have been negligible. Oil 
companies operating in Nigeria are constantly criticised for putting profit 
ahead of fighting poverty, for instance, especially in the communities they 
operate in (Frynas, 2001; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Successive 
governments at the national level have likewise been perceived to be more 
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interested in the maximisation of oil revenue than the well-being of the 
Nigerian people. The Nigerian state would not want to jeopardise its 
symbiotic relationship with the MOCs, which is predicated upon the 
dependence of the country on the oil giants for its share of the rents from 
the oil produced from its territory, while at the same time, the oil 
companies need the oil from Nigeria for their home markets and the profit 
calculations of their shareholders (Obi, 2006: 35).  
It is indeed fair to contend that frustration drove the army of 
unemployed youths into armed confrontations with state security forces. 
The level of insurgency in this area was too overwhelming to be 
recounted here; nonetheless, it is important to mention a few instances.4 
Shortly after the inauguration of a new civilian government in 1999, a 
group of youths under the auspices of the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND), said to be particularly angry with MOBIL oil 
for reneging on their promise couched in what was referred to as a 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’, barricaded MOBIL offices in the Niger 
Delta area for three days (This Day, 6 July 1999: 10). MOBIL had entered 
into an agreement with the community the previous year on various 
aspects of its relationship with the community, including an agreement to 
employ more people from the area. Likewise, in January 2005 militant 
youths numbering about three hundred from the Owaza community in 
Abia State stormed and forcefully shut down oil-flow stations operated by 
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SHDC) on the ground that Shell 
had not been living up to its corporate social responsibilities. This action 
led to the loss of 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil production 
(Punch, 21 January 2005). 
Similarly, in February 2006 MEND members clashed with men of the 
Joint Task Force – a Federal Government’s security outfit – guarding 
some oil installations in the region (Babalola, 2014). The group also 
attacked an oil rig in November 2010, claiming that this attack and other 
similar ones were a reminder to the Nigerian government of the futility of 
                                 
4 For a comprehensive account of petro-violence in the Niger Delta region 
after 1999, see Frynas, 2001; Obi, 2006; Obi and Rustad, 2011; Okonta and 
Douglas, 2003. 
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wasting the nation’s resources in combating militancy without addressing 
the underlying causes of agitation, such as youth unemployment and lack 
of infrastructure, in the oil-producing region 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/11/23/nigeria.mend.claim/in
dex.html). MEND had about two weeks earlier claimed responsibility for 
an attack on an oil rig and the kidnapping of seven people in the region. 
The group in a statement claimed that “all the abducted expatriates are 
well and in our safe custody” 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/11/09/nigeria.oil.rig.kidnapp
ings/). MEND and other militant groups in the area had insisted that the 
causes of their members’ agitation included the government’s failure at 
both federal and state levels to provide them with job opportunities. 
Hostage-taking was also an avenue through which the aggrieved 
youths expressed their anger and frustration towards the Nigerian state, 
but it was also used as a means, especially by the unemployed, to make a 
living. Foreign and Nigerian oil workers, workers of foreign construction 
firms and family members of Nigerian political office holders, as well as 
wealthy Nigerians, were kidnapped for ransom. Hostages were said to be 
classified according to their values, with foreign citizens commanding 
very high value because foreign currency was used to pay the ransom. 
When hostage-taking was started by MEND in mid-2005, it was 
principally for the purpose of drawing official attention both in and 
outside Nigeria to the grave environmental degradation, and socio-
economic marginalisation prevalent in the oil-rich region, and its 
emphasis was on foreign oil workers operating in the area. This explains 
why the activities of the militant youths became a source of stress to the 
Nigerian state, as well as to the importers of the country’s oil. Protests, 
kidnapping, outright vandalism and incessant clashes with state security 
agencies caused enormous destruction of properties, impacting on 
Nigeria’s oil-earning capacity as well as on the international oil market.  
The Role of Youths in the Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria 
The northern part of Nigeria is no stranger to ethnic, religious and 
other forms of violence. As a region, it has witnessed a series of 
convulsions, especially caused by Islamist armed movements such as 
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Maitatsine in the 1980s and Boko Haram, whose current reign of terror 
has continued to elicit national and international concern. But let us begin 
with Maitatsine, a dreaded sect that terrorised northern cities of Kano 
(1980), Kaduna (1982), Yola (1984) and Gombe (1985). This sect was led 
by the late controversial Islamic preacher Mohammed Marwa. Though 
based in Kano, Maitatsine’s ceaseless confrontations with the Nigerian 
security forces and its violent clashes with those considered to be non-
believers, including Christians and mainstream Muslims worsened 
Nigeria’s security environment between 1980 and 1985. The killing of its 
notorious leader alongside about four hundred of his followers in 
December 1980 by the Nigerian Army signalled the beginning of the end 
for the movement (Isichei, 1987; Lubeck, 1985). Remnants of the sect 
continued with their murderous activities until 1985 when they suffered 
another military onslaught that eventually led to the extermination of the 
group.  
Mohammed Marwa migrated from Marwa, in Cameroon, in 1945 and 
became a prominent Islamic preacher in Kano. By 1962, having been 
labelled a dissident preacher, Marwa was deported, but returned to the 
country some years later (Isichei, 1987). He was very charismatic and 
well-liked by many of his followers, who were mostly homeless and 
jobless young men, most of whom had come from the rural areas in the 
north, as well as from neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and 
the Niger Republic either in search of job opportunities or to learn the 
Quran.  
As observed by Hiskett (1987) and Isichei (1987), the Matatsine was 
significantly aided by the almajiri system, whereby parents entrust their 
sons, usually aged between 8 and 15 years, to an Islamic teacher (malam), 
who often takes them far from their homes. These young boys (almajiris) 
are usually sent to the streets to solicit money, food and clothes from 
members of the public. The malams are trusted to instil the discipline 
necessary for success in Islamic scholarship. Marwa, one of such malams, 
convinced of his calling, declared himself a prophet and distanced his 
movement from orthodox Islam (Isichei, 1987: 195; Lubeck, 1985: 370). 
Although Lubeck (1985: 370) had observed that as a social movement, 
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Matatsine falls into “the Mahdist-millenarian tradition, one that is 
associated with violent social protest during periods of social crisis” in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the precise brand of Islam practised by members of 
the movement is in doubt. What is certain, however, is that the main 
strand of Marwa’s teaching was his rejection of affluence, and his 
multitude of followers was attracted to such populist teaching.   
It is pertinent to point out here that the Maitatsine uprising took place 
amidst the widespread deprivation that characterised Nigeria’s Second 
Republic (1979–83). In 1973 oil-exporting countries, including Nigeria, 
witnessed a boom in oil revenue, but this was halted in 1982 when the 
price of oil crashed in the international market. This development led to a 
decline in Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings, which also resulted in a 
serious fiscal problem for the then civilian administration, which had to 
contend with increased poverty and general worsening of the citizens’ 
standard of living (Bangura et al., 1986). The parlous state of the 
economy, manifesting in scarcity, high prices, retrenchment and 
unemployment, notwithstanding, members of the then ruling party, the 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), continued to live a life of affluence. 
This explains why Marwa’s constant attack on material comfort and 
Western materialism enjoyed by the privileged few easily appealed to the 
unemployed and poverty-stricken young men who saw the prevailing 
distribution of wealth as being lopsided. These young men needed no 
further justification to declare war on a society they believed was 
responsible for their privation.  
An important development that threatened the security of Nigeria in 
the post-military era was the adoption of Sharia law in the Muslim-
dominated north of the country.5 In October 1999 the northern state of 
Zamfara extended Sharia to cover both civil and criminal matters, and 
eleven other states followed suit.6 As might be expected in a multi-
                                 
5 Sharia is the Islamic legal system, and is based on the Quran, the Islamic 
holy book, and the Hadith, a narration of Prophet Mohammed’s (the Prophet of 
Islam) life, his teachings and what he approved.  
6 In total, twelve states—Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, 
Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara—adopted Sharia. 
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religious society like Nigeria, the idea was roundly condemned, mostly by 
non-Muslims residing in the affected states who argued that the move was 
an abuse of their human rights, as well as a politically motivated attempt 
by the Muslims to lord themselves over non-Muslims. The bone of 
contention was that while northern Muslims were in support of the full 
implementation of Sharia as a matter of their fundamental human rights, 
the Christians were against its adoption on the grounds that Nigeria is a 
secular state and that their interests as Christians would be jeopardised.  
Critics outside the northern region also argued that the move was an 
aberration, as it was an attempt by these states to adopt Islam as state 
religion, thereby contravening Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution, which 
states that “the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt 
any religion as State religion” (FGN, 1999: 8). Adamolekun (2005: 395) 
indeed argued that implementing Sharia in its fullest form contradicted the 
established practice, which only allowed customary or Sharia courts to 
deal with civil matters. These arguments are predicated on the secularity 
of the country. Nigeria’s federal arrangement recognises the inherent 
cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity that characterises the 
country and also provides the necessary institutional framework for 
reconciling this multiplicity with unity (see FGN, 1999; Mustapha, 2009; 
Suberu, 2009). 
The apprehension showed by non-Muslims is understandable given 
the history of religious turbulence in the northern part of the country (see, 
for example, Hiskett, 1987; Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; Isichei, 1987; Lubeck, 
1985; Suberu, 2009). However, it is important to mention that Sharia was 
not new in the north, although it was limited to civil matters and practised 
only by Muslims. According to Mustapha (2009: 75), shortly before the 
country’s independence in 1960 northern regional leaders, Muslims and 
Christians alike reached a compromise that culminated in the 1958 Penal 
Code that restricted Sharia to civil matters (see also Akande, 1991). And 
contrary to the views expressed in certain quarters, particularly in the 
south, the extension of the Islamic legal system to the realm of criminal 
matters was in response to the overwhelming demands of the Muslim 
electorate in those states (Suberu, 2009). The then governor of Zamfara 
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state, Ahmed Yerima, had promised during his campaign to introduce 
Sharia to address widespread societal decadence, arguing that, under 
Sharia law, “[t]here will be no stealing or corruption and people’s mental 
and spiritual wellbeing is going to be encouraged” (quoted in Abah, 2006: 
3). Thus, the adoption of Sharia was a dividend of democracy in Nigeria’s 
nascent democracy and it enjoyed popular support within the Islamic 
populations of these states, who had hoped that the legal system would 
help to rid the society of corruption that was prevalent during the military 
era.  
As mentioned earlier, the full implementation of Sharia resulted from 
a multiparty electoral process which has allowed Nigerian citizens to 
make demands on the federal political system. One feature of the Sharia 
adopted by these states is that it was practised within the framework of a 
democratic federal system and was implemented by democratically 
elected leaders (Mustapha, 2009; Suberu, 2009). It must also be pointed 
out that the establishment of a Sharia court in any state is at the discretion 
of the state, and parties to a dispute must agree that the matter be 
determined in accordance with Islamic law. Most importantly, the 
country’s apex court, that is, the Supreme Court of Nigeria, can overturn 
judgments passed by Sharia courts. As a matter of fact, what was 
experienced during this period in the northern part of the country was an 
assertion of the autonomy of these states in the legal and religious spheres 
within Nigeria’s federal system. In other words, the adoption of Sharia is 
not unconstitutional and does not undermine the country’s federal 
principle; nonetheless, it was a potential recipe for religious conflict.  
There was little or no surprise when the issue developed into major 
sectarian violence in which the unemployed youth constituency was very 
active. The religious riots that plagued the northern states of Kaduna and 
Kano, in particular between 2000 and 2004, were reminiscent of the 
events that preceded the civil war in 1967. However, Sharia did not 
achieve its widely publicised objective of ridding the society of corruption 
as envisaged by northern Muslims; rather, it deepened the religious 
polarisation in the country (Mustapha, 2009: 76). The then President, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, repeatedly claimed that the Sharia adopted in the 
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Muslim-dominated states was a “political Sharia” that would fade away, 
and, as predicted, the legal system faded away in no time. At the end of 
his administration in 2007, Obasanjo told a congregation of Christians at 
an annual event that he warned the Sharia actors in the north that if the 
Sharia they sought to implement was indeed from God, it would survive, 
but that if it were politically motivated, it would fizzle out (Punch News, 
12 August 2007). 
Boko Haram’s reign of terror, especially from 2009 when the group 
clashed with state security agencies, has particularly seen the country’s 
security threat alert raised to an unprecedented level. The group was 
formed in 2002 in the northern city of Maiduguri as an Islamic religious 
outfit, but attracted worldwide attention in 2009 (Maiangwa et al., 2012; 
Onuoha, 2014). Since then, it has carried out a series of attacks and 
abductions, including the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in 
April 2014. Central to the notorious sect’s objective is the enthronement 
of an Islamic society in which Sharia law will be the overarching 
principle. Boko Haram members are of the view that the prevailing social 
decadence and deprivation in the country are caused by the elite’s 
adherence to Western laws, customs and traditions. This explains the 
group’s disparagement for Western education; hence the name Boko 
Haram, which literarily means that Western education (boko) is a sin 
(haram). Just like with the Maitatsine, the youths also readily buy into the 
preaching of Boko Haram leaders, who maintain that the corrupt attitudes 
of yan boko—the educated elite who occupy various state offices—have 
been responsible for the socio-economic woes, including unemployment 
and poverty, that have befallen the country, particularly northern Nigeria 
(Onuoha, 2014). 
Nigeria, already the world’s most populous nations with about 170 
million people continues to witness rapid population growth that has 
outstripped its economic expansion. Government at all levels build 
infrastructure, but these are inadequate to match the rapidly growing 
population, a situation that has forced government agencies to recommend 
that citizens limit themselves to smaller families as a key to economic 
salvation (Rosenthal, 2012). Nigeria’s population explosion has been 
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attributed to high fertility rates and a relative decline in infant mortality 
rates resulting from general healthcare awareness. Also, the impact of 
religion on the country’s rising population cannot be ignored, as both 
Christianity and Islam, the two dominant religions in the country, detest 
all forms of population control. Although it may be difficult to argue that 
there is a direct correlation between population growth rate and youth 
unemployment, as explained earlier, the rising number of young people in 
the urban areas may explain the country’s youth unemployment and 
poverty situation.  
Boko Haram takes advantage of the unemployment and poverty 
situations in the northern part of the country to co-opt disaffected and 
frustrated youths, most of whom are economically inactive high-school 
leavers, to pursue its radical religious and ideological objectives. 
Pervasive poverty in the area has contributed to a situation in which a 
considerable number of school-age children (almajiris) are not enrolled in 
school and, more often than not, these children are left to fend for 
themselves, roaming the streets begging for alms. They are, without a 
doubt, readily disposed to recruitment into groups willing to provide for 
them. So, it is fair to posit that certain frustrating conditions of life have 
combined to render these youths highly vulnerable to being used to 
perpetrate violence.  
Conclusion  
This paper has demonstrated that the presence of socio-economic 
factors such as unemployment and poverty are crucial to our 
understanding of why many young men turn themselves into foot soldiers 
for armed groups. Nigeria’s unemployed youths have particularly, through 
their membership of insurgency groups, contributed in no small measure 
to the violence that has plagued the country, especially in the period 
following the end of military rule in 1999. Unemployment amongst the 
youths tends to combine with the manipulative tendencies of dissident 
preachers to push young men, and sometimes women, into violence, 
which eventually ignites or maintains insecurity in the country.  
It is amply evident that a poorly catered-for youth becomes 
rebellious, as witnessed in the activities of Nigeria’s deeply frustrated and 
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aggrieved youth population. Therefore, if the Nigerian state is to minimise 
the violent activities that have become synonymous with its unemployed 
youths, then it should harness its energies for productive purposes. The 
state should embark on certain measures capable of engendering youth 
empowerment, because only such a pragmatic approach could bring about 
the desired antidote to insurrection. By empowerment, we mean a 
condition of upward mobility, using a wide range of socio-economic 
variables as they affect the individual within society. Empowering an 
individual is synonymous with improving the individual’s social, political 
and economic conditions, all of which combine to increase the 
individual’s sense of belonging.  
One significant suggestion, therefore, is for the Nigerian state to 
resuscitate the moribund agricultural sector. Prior to the emergence 
of oil as the dominant foreign exchange earner, earnings from 
agricultural exports contributed immensely to the economic growth of 
the country. Nigeria used to be the world’s largest exporter of 
agricultural products such as groundnuts and palm produce, and the 
second largest exporter of cocoa, and these three crops provided 
about 70 per cent of the value of Nigerian exports (Kirk-Greene and 
Rimmer, 1981: 74). However, the oil boom of the early 1970s caused 
capital and labour to be reallocated from the agricultural sector to the 
booming oil sector. So, by 1974 agriculture’s share of total export 
earnings had dropped to less than 20 per cent, whereas petroleum’s 
share of the total earnings accounted for only 10 per cent of export 
earnings in 1962, but rose to 82.7 per cent in 1973 (Bangura et al., 
1986: 177). The decline in agricultural production consequently 
resulted in a situation in which Nigeria, a food exporter at 
independence, was transformed into a food importer. According to 
the Crisis Group Africa Report (CGAR) (2006: 20), in 2002 Nigeria 
imported almost one-third of the rice it consumed, making it the 
world’s second largest rice market. As a further consequence, the 
manufacturing sector’s contribution to the economy became 
negligible. This tide needs to be reversed if Nigeria is to resolve its 
poverty crisis. With its vast arable land and river channels, the north 
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in particular has what it takes to reverse its condition of economic 
deprivation, which partly breeds the terrorist mentality.  
The agrarian sector could also become a huge employer of the 
millions of school leavers roaming the streets in search of non-existent 
jobs. However, a good starting point would be to stimulate youth’s 
interest in agricultural production, for instance, by including the 
teaching of Agricultural Science in school curricular across the 
country. It is also important that Nigeria’s Federal Government 
expands its existing loan schemes. The redundant People’s Bank 
could be restored. This bank was established in 1989 by the military 
regime of Babangida to provide credit facilities to low-income earners 
embarking on agricultural production, with special consideration to 
youth engaged in agricultural production (Akpan, 2010). Also, 
commercial banks may set up micro-credit schemes to provide school 
leavers with agricultural loans. Availability of small-scale loans and 
other forms of credit facilities would provide an opportunity for those 
who want to go into farming to acquire the necessary farming tools, 
thereby transforming the youths into a group of self-employed and 
even employers of labour in the event that their agriculture businesses 
expand. Sustainable expansion of the agricultural sector will play a 
key role in enhancing food sufficiency, and also in creating job 
opportunities for youths, especially in the rural areas. This will in turn 
reduce rural–urban migration. However, the government must put in 
place checks on the managers of the scheme to avoid corrupt 
practices, such as the type that led to the collapse of the People’s 
Bank. 
Likewise, government at all levels should partner with the private 
sector to promote vocational education, allowing unemployed youths 
to acquire some skills and learn a life-long trade. The country’s 
increasing unemployment underscores the need for vocational 
education, such as the type usually offered by technical colleges that 
have now become defunct across the country. The society’s excessive 
focus on formal education and the subsequent neglect of vocational 
education has partly contributed to the rising unemployment among 
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the country’s youth population. Secondary school leavers with no 
qualifications to pursue a university or college degree should be 
encouraged and supported to access certain vocational training like 
tailoring, plumbing, bricklaying, carpentry and so on. Although with 
little support from government agencies, individual entrepreneurs 
across major cities and rural communities offer vocational and 
technical education programmes, but these have not been enough to 
accommodate the growing number of unemployed young people in 
need of skills acquisition. Governments should increase the funding of 
vocational education, as efforts like this will go a long way not only in 
keeping youths off the streets, but will also contribute to the 
alleviation of poverty. 
Government at the national level should also create an enabling 
environment capable of engendering inclusivity by providing job 
opportunities for erstwhile terrorists. Such a move will transform 
them into responsible members of society. Similar palliative measures 
proved successful in the Niger Delta area of the country, where 
amnesty programmes were tailored towards the rehabilitation of 
erstwhile militants who eschewed violence. In 2009 the then president 
of Nigeria, the late Umar Yar’Adua, offered an unconditional pardon 
and cash payments to rebels who agreed to lay down their arms and 
start small-scale businesses of their choice (Rice, 2009). Others were 
offered scholarships to enable them to further their education. The 
amnesty deal was hailed in some quarters as a positive move to 
resolving the region’s lingering crisis, but it was also condemned in 
others as rewarding violence.  
It is crystal clear, as exemplified by the activities of MEND and 
Boko Haram in particular, that there is a linkage between youth 
unemployment and insurgency in Nigeria. Therefore, we are of the 
view that empowering Nigerian youths would serve as a fundamental 
antidote to insurrection in the country. 
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